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Abstract (*) 
The measurement of the effects that public support to private R&D has on R&D investment and output has attracted 
substantial empirical research in the last decade. The focus of this research has mostly focused on testing for possible 
crowding out effects. There is virtually no study aiming at understanding how and why these effects may or may not 
be occurring. In addition, the effects of the two most common tools of public support, direct funding through grants 
and loans, and tax incentives, have been studied separately.  
We contribute to existing work by focusing on the determinants of the use by firms of these two mechanisms and 
their potential link to sources of market failures. We think this is an important step to assess impact estimates. Using 
firm-level data from the Spanish Community Innovation Survey (CIS), we find that firms that face financial 
constraints, as well as newly created firms, are less likely to use R&D tax credits and more likely to apply for and 
obtain direct public funding. We also find that large firms that care about knowledge protection are more likely to 
apply for and obtain direct funding, while SMEs are more likely to use tax incentives. Our results show that direct 
funding and tax credits, as currently designed, are not perfect substitutes because firms are heterogeneous, and 
suggest that from a social perspective, and provided that crowding out effects can be ruled out for both instruments, 
some combination of both may be preferable to relying on only one.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Tax incentives and direct funding are two instruments currently used in many countries to 
stimulate private R&D activity. Both belong to a broader package of measures addressed to 
enhance private research and innovation activities that includes intellectual property rights, 
public funding of basic research and public provision of venture capital. While direct public 
funding of private R&D has a long tradition in many countries, tax incentives have spread 
gradually, although with some exceptions. Canada, The Netherlands and Japan rely mostly on 
tax incentives, while direct funding is still preferred Sweden, Finland or Germany. Other 
countries combine both instruments France, Denmark, Spain and the United States fall in this 
category. Figure 1, shows OECD estimates of the relative weight of each instrument as a share 
of GDP in 2009 by country. 
 
Figure 1: Direct funding and Tax Incentives for business R&D 2009 
(in % of GDP) 
 
 
Notes:  
Direct funding includes grants, credits and public procurement. Indirect funding refers to all tax 
incentives related to R&D: tax credits and allowances, social security contributions, reductions in R&D 
labor taxes. Sub-national tax incentives are not included. Israel, Italy and Slovak Republic proved R&D 
tax incentives but cost estimates are not available. For detailed information check the source. 
Source: OCDE (2011a), OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2011 
 
The common argument for the provision of public incentives to private R&D activities rests on 
the positive spillovers associated to the production of knowledge. There is by now a large body 
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of empirical evidence showing a gap between estimates of private and social returns to R&D at 
the firm, industry and country level, providing thus a solid ground for policy measures. A 
second argument for public support that adds to the first is the undersupply of funding for 
innovative projects. Technical and market risk, coupled with asymmetric information between 
the innovator and the financial investor, generate a gap between the cost of capital for these 
projects and the market cost of capital. Since external finance is more expensive than internal 
finance, only firms that have sufficient internal finance will undertake some R&D projects.
1
  
 
Which particular form public support should take to correct for these sources of market failure 
is, however, a matter of debate. Do both instruments in practice address both sources of market 
failures? Are there situations where one is to be preferred to the other? Or, in other words, is 
there an “optimal mix” of both instruments? While there is substantial empirical research 
estimating the effects of each instrument separately on private R&D decisions and outcomes 
(see for instance Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen, 2002 and Lokshin and Mohnen, 2011 for 
evidence on tax credits; and Gelabert, Fosfuri and Tribó, 2009 and Czarnitzki, Ebersberger and 
Fier, 2007 for direct grants), to the best of our knowledge the explicit comparative analysis 
embedded in the questions we raise remain virtually unexplored.
2
 
 
This paper contributes a step in this direction by bringing into focus the comparative allocation 
of tax credits and direct funding. We take the two traditional factors causing market failures in 
R&D, knowledge spillovers and financial constraints, and assume that if they truly affect firms’ 
decisions, they must be perceived by firms as hurdles to potential innovation plans. We then 
study whether a relationship exists between these hurdles and the use of each instrument, 
                                                 
1
 Hall and Lerner (2009), who survey the evidence on the funding gap for investment in innovation,  
conclude that even in the absence of knowledge externalities small and new firms experience high costs 
of capital;  for large firms, however, the evidence is mixed. 
2
 The comparative study of policy instruments is an important issue for policy-makers.  See the testimony 
by the OECD for the US Senate Committee on Finance, OECD(2011b). 
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controlling for a set of factors. This step may provide insights for interpreting the range of 
results that are obtained in impact evaluation studies.
3
 
 
We use firm-level data from two waves of the Spanish Community Innovation Survey (CIS) to 
study this question. We find that firms that face financial constraints to undertake innovation 
projects, as well as newly created firms, are less likely to use R&D tax credits. SMEs that face 
this type of constraint, however, are more likely to apply and obtain direct public funding. 
Regarding appropriability concerns, large firms that care about protection are more likely to 
apply for and obtain direct funding, while SMEs are more likely to use tax incentives. Our main 
results are robust to changes in the definition of dependent variables and for most subsamples of 
firms. 
 
These results suggest that direct funding and tax credits are not perfect substitutes. Firms that 
are financially constrained but have good innovation projects need support to be able to carry 
them out and obtain profits before being able to claim tax credits. Firms that face small limited 
appropriability difficulties may find tax incentives more appealing than direct support because 
the cost of applying for direct funding may be high compared to the chances of obtaining it 
when innovation is not very drastic. Provided that crowding out effects can be ruled out for both 
instruments, some combination of both would be preferable from a social point of view to 
relying on only one. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we review a selection of literature related 
to our research questions. In section 3 we describe the data, variables and empirical model that 
                                                 
3
 To illustrate this point: assume that from firm-level data we obtain that there is no additionality in 
private R&D expenditure, and  that the share of sales of new products is not significantly different from 
non-supported firms. Should we conclude that the policy is not effective? The answer depends on whether 
supported activities generate spillovers that are captured by the firms’competitors. Since spillovers are 
one of the theoretical arguments for providing public support, allocation equations should capture this 
concern to some extent. 
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will be used. In section 4 we show and discuss estimation results. Finally section 5 contains 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. PREVIOUS EVIDENCE AND SOME NEW PROPOSITIONS. 
Many theoretically possible policy instruments to address market failures affecting R&D may 
have drawbacks. Direct public funding through subsidies or grants reduces the private costs of 
investing in R&D, but places high information requirements for the public agency awarding 
them. Tax credits and allowances may appear to be a neutral, simple and non-interfering tool, 
but the specific design is important, as they may be claimed for projects that the firm would 
have been done anyway. Producing empirical evidence evaluating the impact of both on a set of 
outcomes becomes very valuable for policy design and improvement. Over the last ten years, a 
significant volume of empirical research to assess the impact of either direct support or of R&D 
tax credits on the level of private R&D investment has been developed. The main concern of 
most of this research has been testing for the presence of full crowding out effects, which would 
imply a waste of public resources, but the impact on other outcomes such as patents, 
productivity or sales of new products has also been analyzed.  
 
With only a few exceptions (Haegeland and Moen, 2007, Berubé and Mohnen, 2009 and Marra, 
2008), however, the effects of each tool have been studied separately.
4
 Tax incentives are 
usually modelled as part of the user cost of capital in standard investment models, where the 
estimated R&D price elasticity provides a measure of the impact of tax incentives. Bloom, 
Griffith and Van Reenen (2002) used country-level data and found an elasticity of about 0.1 in 
the short run and about 1 in the long run. Firm level studies have followed since, and some cast 
                                                 
4
 Haegeland and Moen (2007) find that the additionality of tax credits is higher than the additionality of 
grants awarded through the Research Council and Innovation Norway, which would be consistent with 
the latter selecting projects with large externalities but low private return. Berubé and Mohnen (2009), 
whose sample of Canadian firms contains firms that benefit from tax credits, a subset of which received 
subsidies, find that those receiving subsidies introduced more new products and made more world-first 
product innovations. These authors estimate program participation equations that do not include 
indicators of financing constraints or of spillovers. Marra (2008) estimates an R&D investment equation 
and finds that both instruments increase private investment.  
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a somewhat skeptical view on this type of R&D support, at least for level-based tax incentives. 
In particular, Lokshin and Mohnen (2011), using a Dutch panel of firm level data, obtain 
elasticities of 0.4 and 0.8 respectively. They also find that elasticities are larger (in absolute 
value) for small firms (less than 200 employees) than for large firms. Using these elasticities 
they estimate that 1 euro of tax receipts foregone generates 3.2 euros of R&D by small firms, 
0.78 euros for large firms. For large firms therefore crowding out cannot be rejected.
5
 They 
suggest that small firms may be more sensitive to tax incentives because they are more likely to 
be credit constrained, but do not test this proposition.    
 
The purpose of this modelling approach is to explain R&D investment as a function of its price, 
and provides a framework for testing crowding out effects, which is an extremely important 
issue. But it is not designed to ask which firms are more likely to use tax incentives, and in 
particular whether incentives allow firms that were not doing R&D to switch to doing R&D.  
Answers to these questions could offer valuable insights for interpreting estimated elasticities. 
 
A different empirical approach provides a way to test this, although it has not been fully 
exploited. Rather than using a structural approach, some researchers have used matching 
methods to obtain an estimate of the impact of tax credits on some outcomes. This method 
requires controlling for program participation (selection into treatment) in order to be able to 
compare the outcomes of treated and untreated firms, and involves therefore the estimation of a 
program participation equation. Even though this is usually done as a purely technical step, 
results may contain valuable information for policy evaluation if the equation is adequately 
specified. Corchuelo and Martínez Ros (2008), and Czarnitzki et al (2011) provide two 
examples of this approach.
6
 Corchuelo and Martínez Ros, using Spanish firm-level data, find 
that small, financially stable firms (those with a ratio of equity over debt higher than 0.5) are 
                                                 
5
 They use the estimated elasticities to run some simulations to calculate the additional R&D investment 
generated by the tax incentive and the foregone tax income, finding that the government revenue loss is 
much larger than the increase in private R&D. From this the authors conclude that potential spillovers 
would have to be very large in order to compensate for the deadweight loss. 
6
 See Cappelen et al (2008) for work with Norwegian data, and Duguet (2010) with French firms. 
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more likely to use tax credits.
7
 These results suggest that this type of support is more appealing 
to small unconstrained firms rather than to constrained firms. Czarnitzki et al use a sample of 
Canadian firms and include the price-cost margin as an indicator of the firm's internal funding 
capacity in a probit model of the probability that a firm will use R&D tax credits. They find a 
positive relationship, although it is not evident how to interpret this result in terms of financial 
constraints, partly because in their sample there were firms that had also received R&D grants 
and they all claimed tax credits. Appropriability indicators as a potential determinant of the use 
of public support are not considered in all this work. 
 
Research on the impact of direct funding (grants and loans) is extensive and shall not be 
thoroughly reviewed here. The main point of interest for our purposes is that regardless of the 
modelling approach (whether structural or non-structural methods), some program participation 
equation is estimated. As before, this is usually taken as a purely technical step to proceed to 
matching treated and non treated firms. Generally, firm size, industry dummies, and other firm 
characteristics are typically included in the equation, but no link is made to indicators of market 
failures. In some cases, an indicator of the firm’s financial situation is included among the 
control variables. Hussinger (2008), for example, uses a credit rating index, and finds that firms 
with better rating are more likely to obtain direct public funding in Germany. Czarnitzki et al 
(2007) use an indicator of appropriability, but do not include indicators for funding constraints.      
 
Possibly the work closest to ours in the interest for linking impact evaluation to the presumed 
market failures is Gelabert, Fosfuri and Tribó (2009), who find evidence that the degree of 
appropriability matters in explaining the magnitude of the effect that direct public support has 
on privately financed internal R&D. Although their focus is on the estimation of the additional 
private R&D investment generated by public support, they estimate a program participation 
equation where indicators of appropriability and financial constraints are included. Only the 
                                                 
7
 Corchuelo and Martínez Ros also include the lagged B-index in the separate equations for small and 
large firms, finding that it affects the use of tax credits by large firms, but not by SMEs. 
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latter is found to be significant, although with a negative sign: contrary to expected, firms with 
more financial constraints are less likely to obtain direct support. The authors, however, do not 
explicitly address the link between indicators of market failures and the comparative use of the 
two forms of support, direct subsidies and tax incentives.
8
  
 
Our work, therefore, adds to the existing body of research by explicitly seeking to test whether 
there is a correlation between the two potential sources of underinvestment in R&D and the 
actual use of direct support and tax incentives. The different nature of both tools in some 
relevant dimensions, and the different degree of public involvement associated to each, set the 
stage for anticipating heterogeneous effects both across tools and across firms.  
 
A focus on the allocation and use of two types of R&D support. 
Some differences in the design of direct funding and tax incentives may have an impact on who 
benefits from each as well as on some outcomes. Direct public funding is obtained by a firm 
only if the firm presents an application to the public agency and the public agency decides 
favourably after screening the proposals. The requirements explicitly and publicly set by the 
public agency are usually related to the innovative content of the proposal, the technical ability 
of the firm to carry it out, and the potential market.
9
 The agency may have additional 
preferences for some industries or type of innovation project: it may consider, for instance the 
expected spillovers generated by the project, or the extent of financing constraints faced by the 
firm, but these do not seem to be made explicit in national-level programs. The firm runs the 
project once funding has been approved. Funded projects will reflect both firm and agency 
preferences: firms will be interested in projects that are profitable after taking into account 
public support, but by determining the size of this support the agency may select projects that 
have social value but low private value. There are two drawbacks: 1) applying for direct support 
has a cost for the firms since preparing a proposal takes time and resources that have an 
                                                 
8
 Gonzalez, Jaumandreu and Pazo (2005) provide an excellent analysis of subsidy effectiveness, but do 
not study the role of appropriability and financing constraints. 
9
  See Huergo and Trenado (2008).   
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opportunity cost which may not be small for SMEs, and 2) screening for appropriate projects 
has a cost for the public agency as well.   
 
Tax credits, on the other hand, do not require the presentation and approval of a specific project. 
A firm may claim a tax credit on any expense that qualifies as a research and development 
expenditure according to the tax code. The only requirement usually is for the firm to follow 
proper accounting rules for this type of expenses. A firm will obviously tend to select R&D 
projects that have a high private profitability. Claiming the credit is relatively easy if the firm 
fulfills these conditions, because it does so when filing for the corporate tax in period t+1. To be 
able to benefit from a tax credit, however, the firm must have positive taxable income. Although 
possibly less costly for firms, this mechanism involves some monitoring costs for the tax 
authorities. In addition, nothing guarantees that the size of the tax credit will be related to the 
equivalent optimal subsidy if spillovers are an important issue.  
 
A potentially important difference between both tools is that, in the case of tax credits, the firm 
must be able to privately fund the project ex-ante, and expect to have taxable income during the 
same period or within a reasonable horizon. New and small firms may hence be at a 
disadvantage to benefit from this instrument. An additional difference is that tax credits may be 
pro-cyclical, in contrast to direct support.  
  
There is virtually no theoretical model of firms’ and agency behaviour regading R&D subsidies. 
Two exceptions are Takalo and Tanayama (2010) and Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen (2011), 
who focus on direct support. The first is a theoretical paper linking firms facing constraints to 
finance their R&D projects, some of which are high quality and others are low quality, and 
subsidy allocation. The model predicts that firms with high quality projects will always apply 
for funding, and that subsidies will increase private effort through two effects: 1) by reducing 
the amount of market based capital, they reduce its cost, and 2) the subsidy becomes a signal of 
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quality for private external funds, which again then reduces their cost.
10
 In the corporate 
taxation literature, Keuschnigg and Ribi (2010) discuss how business taxation may affect 
financially constrained innovative firms, and find that R&D tax credits encourage innovation 
but also relax finance constraints and help innovative firms to exploit investment opportunities 
to a larger extent. 
 
The description of these differences between R&D tax credits and direct support and the 
theoretical analysis of Takalo and Tanayama and of Keuschnigg and Ribi suggest some intuitive 
propositions regarding the observed use of each mechanism. The core propositions we want to 
test are the following:  
 
1. Tax incentives can be considered to be a prize after the investment; they will therefore 
be more attractive for firms without severe internal or external financing constraints. 
2. Direct public funding will be preferred by firms that face financial constraints because 
this tool provides ex-ante co-financing of projects and, in addition, may allow the firm 
to rise more private funding after being awarded a grant or loan. 
3. Firms with projects facing substantial appropriability problems will prefer direct 
funding rather than tax incentives. When projects produce quickly imitable innovations, 
the firm may not expect they will produce a significant stream of profits, nor, 
consequently, a significant tax credit. 
4. Firms engaging in projects with small appropriability problems will prefer tax 
incentives to direct funding, especially if the cost of applying for direct funding is 
relatively high relative to the expected grant, and the expected probability of being 
awarded a grant is small.  
                                                 
10
 Takalo et al (2011) model the subsidy allocation process as a game of incomplete information; their 
main purpose is to estimate the expected return on subsidies for the agency.      
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5. New or young firms that intend to innovate are more likely to apply for and obtain 
direct support than use tax incentives, because they usually are more affected by 
financial constraints or have little taxable income. 
 
There are obviously other factors that may affect a firm’s decision to apply for or use public 
support for R&D. These include all those shaping the incentives to innovate and/ or perform 
R&D, such as market structure. In particular, in industries with an established dominant firm the 
incentives for rival’s R&D may be reduced (Cabral and Polak, 2007). Competitive pressure, 
vertical integration, sunk entry costs and market size may also affect the profitability of 
engaging in product or process innovations (Aghion et al., 2005 and 2009; Artés, 2009). Some 
of these factors may be partially taken into account in our empirical analysis. We now turn to 
the description of the most relevant features of our data. 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL DESIGN: DATA, VARIABLES AND ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
3.1. The DATA  
The PITEC is a firm-level panel data set developed by the Spanish Statistical Office (INE) 
based on the Community Innovation Survey, which in Spain is conducted annually. This data 
base collects information related to innovation activities by firms with more than 10 employees 
from all manufacturing and service industries. Spanish firms have a legal obligation to respond 
to questionnaires submitted by INE, and the response rate is high (around 90%).The sample is 
highly representative of large firms (those with 200 or more employees). It also contains a large 
number of firms with less than 200 employees, but in this case the sample is biased towards 
innovators. 
11
 
 
                                                 
11
 This is so because all firms that have received any form of public support for R&D or those that have 
reported R&D expenses in the current or past years are surveyed every year. The remaining surveyed 
firms come from a random sample stratified by size and sector among  non-R&D performing firms 
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We use data from the surveys conducted yearly from 2005 to 2008. It is important to note that 
some questions refer to a three year period (2003-2005; 2004-2006; and so on) and some to the 
year previous to the survey. Examples of the first type of information are geographical market 
of the firm, introduction of new products and/or processes, information sources, cooperation to 
innovate, barriers to innovation, use of public support to innovate and use of intellectual 
property. Examples of the second type are the number of employees, sales volume, exports, 
innovation expenditures by category (in-house R&D and others), and sources of funding for in-
house R&D. A distinctive characteristic of this survey is the availability of qualitative 
information on barriers to innovation as perceived by the firm, as well as on the importance of 
several sources of information for the firm's innovation process.
12
.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 describe some features of the sample related to public support for business R&D. 
Because of the different population representativity, we distinguish along the whole empirical 
analysis between SMEs and large firms. The last two columns in Table 1 provide information 
on the extent of the bias towards innovative firms in our sample relative to a representative 
data source for manufacturing firms frequently used in empirical work, the ESEE. The table 
shows that for large firms both data sources are very similar in terms of the share of firms that 
invest in R&D or use R&D support. In the case of SMEs, about 50% of firms in the PITEC 
sample invest in R&D against 24% in the ESEE sample. SMEs using public support are also 
overrepresented in PITEC. However, an important advantage of PITEC relative to ESEE is the 
larger sample size, a feature which becomes important for estimation purposes.
13
 Table 1 also 
shows that, according to both data sources, the use of tax credits is more widespread than direct 
support, particularly in the sample of SMEs, and that overall large firms benefit proportionally 
more from both tools.  
 
                                                 
12
 The Community Innovation Survey has been widely used in many policy evaluation studies.  
13
 Note for example that according to the information in Table 1 in 2008 only 12% of large firms in the 
ESEE sample used both tax credits and direct support, that is, 61 observations maximum, while in the 
PITEC sample there are about 110 observations. 
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Table 1. Public support to private R&D  
MANUFACTURING FIRMS PITEC ESEE 
 SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE 
Total number of firms in the sample in 2008 4503 1074 1512 493 
% firms invest in innovation in 2008 (a) 
(includes R&D and other innovation related expenditures)  
64.5 79.6 n.a. n.a. 
% firms invest in R&D in 2008 (in-house and/or external 
contracting)) 
57.8 72.5 
 
23.7 70.6 
% firms introduced new products/services in 2006-2008 57.9 74.4 n.a. n.a. 
% firms introduced new products, services or new 
processes in 2008  
75.8 84.3 29.3 59.4 
% firms that received direct support from the Central 
Administration in 2008 (a) 
8.3 19.2 3.4 20.0 
% firms obtained tax incentives in 2008 (b) 21.5 34.6 7.1 31.7 
% firms used both types of support in 2008 (b) 4.1 10.6 1.8 12.5 
% firms benefiting from tax incentives that also received 
direct support in 2008 (b) 
19.2 30.6 25.0 39.4 
% firms having direct support that also claimed tax 
incentives in 2008 (b) 
49.5 55.3 52.7 62.5 
% firms received direct support from the Central 
Administration in 2006-2008 (loans and grants) 
15.7 34.1   
% firms obtained tax incentives in 2006-2008 26.8 44.5   
% firms used both types of support in 2006-2008 8.5 23.6   
% firms benefiting from tax incentives that received direct 
support 
31.7 53.1   
% firms benefiting from direct support that also claimed tax 
incentives in 2006-2008 
54.2 69.4   
Notes:  
a) Definitions: Innovate = firms that introduce at least one product, or process or service innovation 
in the period 2006-2008; Invests in Innovation = has positive investment during 2008 in any of 
the following categories: in-house R&D, external R&D, acquisition of equipment or software, 
acquisition of external knowledge, training, design and market introduction of innovations. 
b)  In the case of PITEC, the total number of observations may vary for some of the annual 
variables: in 2008, the number of SMEs is 3912 and the number of large firms is 933. 
 
 
Some questions in the survey are of particular interest because they provide indicators that can 
be related to potential sources of underinvestment in R&D. Firms are asked to rank a series of 
potential barriers to innovate according to the degree of importance they have for the firm. In 
particular, the barriers they are asked about are, among others, financing constraints, both 
internal and external, and demand uncertainty, which be associated to market failure in the 
financial market for R&D projects. Quite surprisingly, the list of questions does not include any 
related to a firm’s concern for imitation by rivals, which would provide an indicator of potential 
spillover effects. Two surveys, the Yale survey (Levin et al 1987) and the Carnegie Mellon 
Survey (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000) conducted in the US were designed to obtain 
information about the firms’ view about the effectiveness of some appropriation mechanisms: 
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legal (patents, trademarks, design or copyright), secrecy, and others (lead time, complementary 
manufacturing or services), and in some early editions the CIS survey contained similar 
questions.
14
 The current version of the Spanish CIS, however, includes only questions about the 
actual use of legal protection mechanisms. Finally, the item "market dominated by established 
enterprises" points to one feature of market structure that may affect potentially a firm's 
decisions, as predicted by some theoretical models (Cabral and Polak, 2007). Table 2 describes 
manufacturing firms' perceptions about barriers to innovation.  
 
Table 2 Perceived constraints to innovation in the period 2006-2008 
A. Manufacturing Firms 
SMEs
4,7
6,8
9,6
10,0
13,5
13,7
22,2
26,5
35,2
38,0
39,6
15,3
15,6
33,0
30,3
34,4
22,1
31,6
34,6
30,3
30,7
31,6
28,7
28,7
35,9
37,6
30,3
27,0
24,2
21,0
16,7
16,6
14,0
51,3
48,9
21,4
22,1
21,9
37,2
22,0
17,9
17,8
14,8
14,9
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
No need due to prior innovations
Lack of demand for innovation
Lack of information on technology
Lack of information  on markets
Lack of qualified personnel
Difficulties in finding partners
Market dominated by established businesses
Uncertain demand for innovative goods or services
Lack of external finance
Lack of internal finance
High innovation cost
High Medium Low Not relevant
 
Large Firms
4,
6,2
5,0
4,9
5,9
6,5
15,2
17,2
19,9
20,9
23,7
11,1
11,9
25,0
24,0
27,8
22,1
26,1
34,3
30,5
34,1
32,5
28,8
27,8
44,1
43,0
40,0
34,5
31,6
25,8
24,5
24,8
23,8
55,9
54,1
25,8
28,0
26,3
37,0
27,2
22,7
25,0
20,2
19,9
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
No need due to prior innovations
Lack of demand for innovation
Lack of information on technology
Lack of information  on markets
Lack of qualified personnel
Difficulties in finding partners
Market dominated by established businesses
Uncertain demand for innovative goods or services
Lack of external finance
Lack of internal finance
High innovation cost
High Medium Low Not relevant
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 These data have been used for example by Cockburn and Griliches (1988) to study the stock market’s 
valuation of R&D and patents, and more recently by Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) Ceccagnoli (2009).  
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Lack of internal and external finance, together with uncertain demand, are the barriers more 
often perceived as important. SMEs are more sensitive to these than large firms, as well as to 
access to information on markets or technology. It is worth noting that the simple correlation 
among the first three barriers is high, while it decreases across the remaining barriers. For large 
manufacturing firms, the correlation between the importance of internal and external funding is 
0.71 (for SME is 0.74) while the correlation between the importance of lack of funding and 
knowledge factors is around 0.4. We have checked whether firms change their perceptions of 
barriers between the 2005 and 2008 surveys, and find that about half of the firms keep the same 
perception. Almost all that change their answer do so only moderately (they may change from 
level of importance  "high" to level "medium", but very few change from level "high" to "not 
relevant".    
 
3.2. KEY VARIABLES 
We use two waves of PITEC: PITEC 2005, where some of the explanatory variables of interest 
refer to the period 2003-2005, and some to year 2005, and PITEC 2008, where variables refer 
either to the period 2006-2008 or to year 2008. In order to be able to deal at least partially with 
potential endogeneity, we use most explanatory variables from PITEC 2005, while dependent 
variables are from PITEC 2008. We describe next the definition of each variable, indicating in 
brackets the name assigned to the variable in the tables showing estimation results. 
 
Having claimed tax deductions for R&D and obtaining direct support are our two dependent 
variables. For Tax Incentives, we define a binary variable which equals 1 if the firm declares 
having claimed tax credits any or all of the years in the period 2006-2008. We believe that since 
tax credits are subject to carry-forward provisions, using a number of years may provide a more 
accurate description of behavior than using yearly data. In addition, questions about direct 
support also refer to a three year period. We nevertheless test for the sensitivity of results to 
changes in the definition of the dependent variables.  
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Direct support. We define a binary variable which equals 1 if the firm has applied for and 
obtained direct funding from the Central Administration in the period 2006-2008. Although 
firms may obtain direct support from local, central or European administrations, we consider 
that, since tax incentives are defined at the country level, the appropriate funding source they 
should be compared to is Central government support.
15
 Note that the survey does not provide 
information on whether a firm applied for but did not obtain direct support. The observed 
outcome will therefore capture not only the firm's decision but also the public agency's 
preferences. 
Financial constraints. As shown above, firms report the degree of importance of lack of access 
to internal and to external financing as a barrier to innovation. Because of the observed high 
correlation between both barriers, we define a single binary variable which equals 1 if the firm 
considers that either of them has high importance as a barrier in the period 2003-2005. [obfin5] 
Appropriability. It is difficult to measure the degree of ex-ante appropriability of R&D 
investments, in order to test the extent to which it may deter innovation. We know 
appropriability matters because we observe that firms use the patent system and that there is 
patent litigation activity. In much existing work, the standard indicator of appropriability has 
been the use of protection mechanisms. We also take this approach and define a binary variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the firm has used any of the legal protection mechanisms 
(copyrights, trademarks, design or patent) in the period 2003-2005 [protect5]. Although this 
variable might capture past innovation experience, we also will include, as a control, past in-
house R&D [idin5], so that we expect that the use of protection methods in the past captures the 
concern the firm has for potential imitation.  
 
We will also use answers to a question about the importance that the firm gives to information 
from competitors as a source of ideas for innovation in the period 2003-2005 [Infocomp5] to 
construct a second indicator of spillovers. Although meant to capture incoming spillovers 
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 There are in Spain 17 regional governments that also provide support for innovation. Although none 
uses tax incentives, they may provide direct support. Eligibility criteria may differ across regional 
agencies. See Blanes and Busom (2004).   
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(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002), it may also capture the extent of rivalry in the firm's 
industry.
16
 It is interesting to note that only 14% of firms in the sample admit that information 
from competitors is of high importance to the firm.  
Dominant Firm. To capture the possible disincentive effect that the existence of an established 
dominant firm may have on other firms, we define a binary variable which equals 1 if the firm 
considers that this is a barrier of high importance. [obdomin5] 
New firm. Because young or newly created firms may not have much taxable income, and at the 
same time, may face financing constraints because they lack reputation, we expect them to be 
less likely to use tax incentives when intending to generate and introduce innovations, and more 
likely to apply for direct funding. We define a binary variable to represent a new firm in 2003-
2005. [New firm5] 
 
Other barriers are also included in the empirical specification, although they are not the main 
focus of this research. They are introduced as binary variables, where the value is equal to 1 if 
the firm considers that a particular barrier is of high importance [obpers5, obinfor5].  
 
Regarding the set of questions on barriers, it is important to note that several studies that have 
used CIS data for different countries have obtained counterintuitive results. One of the most 
recently examples is found in a study by the OCDE (2009), which reports the results of a multi-
country effort to find regularities in the probability that a firm will innovate and the effects of 
innovation on productivity.
17
 The surprising result from the OCDE study is that it finds for most 
countries a positive association between most barriers and the probability to engage in 
innovation.  
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 Note that in all CIS surveys only innovating firms are asked to answer this item. Czarnitzki et al (2007) 
also used this question to construct an industry-level index of appropriability.  
17
 The same type of firm-level data source and methodology were used for each country; the data being of 
a cross-section nature. 
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A possible explanation that has been offered is that innovative firms become more aware of the 
difficulties associated to innovating than non-innovating firms. This interpretation suggests that 
self-assessment of barriers may be endogenous to innovative behavior, particularly because in 
these studies barriers and innovative behavior refer to the same period. An additional problem is 
that there may be individual-specific heterogeneity in subjective evaluations: some mangers 
may tend to be optimistic, while others pessimistic. Subjective self-evaluations and subjective 
expectations, however, are increasingly used in empirical research in other fields.
18
 We address 
these concerns by i) using lagged indicators of barriers and ii) including an additional control 
variable that aims at capturing the firm's overall perception of difficulties, which is computed as 
follows: we add the rankings given by the firm to all barriers, and rescale so that it takes values 
in a 0 to 1 scale [obstAll5]. Larger values indicate that a firm perceives a high overall level of 
barriers.
19
 We expect that this variable will capture the awareness effect, so the importance of 
individual barriers may be isolated from the firm’s overall individual-specific perception. 
 
3.3. CONTROL VARIABLES 
The survey included in 2008 a new question related to tax incentives. Each firm was asked 
whether it took into account existing tax incentives when planning its potential R&D 
investment. We believe that the answer captures the managers' view on the strategic importance 
of R&D for their firm. Lacking other indicators of managerial characteristics that might be 
relevant for innovation decisions, we include this binary indicator as a control variable 
(plantax).
20
  
 
We include a measure of technological distance of the firm relative to the mean of it sector of 
activity. The idea is that incentives to innovate are affected by the firm's position relative to the 
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 See for instance Zafar (2011) 
19
 We later check for the robustness of estimates to alternative ways to control for these potential biases.  
20
 Note that taking into account tax credit incentives does not predetermine claiming them. Although most 
firms that do not take them into account do not claim tax credits, 56% of SMEs and 60% of large firms 
that do take them into account do not claim them. The Pearson correlation between the two variables is 
.28 for SMEs and .30 for large firms.   
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technological frontier, as shown in Aghion et al., 2009. Manufacturing is classified into 30 
subsectors, and for each we compute the average labor productivity as sales per employee. We 
then divide each firm's labor productivity in 2005 by the average of its sector (ldistprod5).  
We include several variables to control for heterogeneity across firms, most of them binary. Past 
R&D activity [rdin5], belonging to a group [group5], being a private domestic firm [privdom5], 
being an exporter [bexp5], location near a science or technological park [park], regional location 
and industry dummies capturing technological intensity [high, medium high, medium low and 
low]. We also include as control variables size, measured by the log of the number of employees 
(lsize5); human capital, measured by the proportion of employees with a higher education 
degree (humcap5), and the age of the firm (age5).  
 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows the main descriptive statistics for these variables, for SMEs 
and large firms. Regarding the appropriability measures, we note that around 35% of firms 
declare having used legal protection mechanisms in 2003-2005. We find surprising, however, 
that only 14% of firms, whether large or SMEs, consider information from competitors to be of 
high relevance for their innovation plans. To put this number in perspective, we can compare it 
to the percentage obtained in the German and French CIS surveys. According to Eurostat, in 
Germany 17% of manufacturing innovative firms considered this source to be highly important 
in 2008, against 11% in Spain’s (percentages increase slightly with firm size) and 9% in France. 
Regarding the importance of conferences, trade fairs and exhibitions, the percentages were 18% 
for German firms, 5 % for Spanish firms, and 10% for French firms. One possible interpretation 
of these differences is that innovation management and style differ across countries even among 
innovative firms.   
 
3.4. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
Given that we observe whether a firm obtains or not direct support, and whether it uses or not 
tax incentives, we specify a model with two binary dependent variables. We use a bivariate 
probit model because it allows for correlation between the random terms across alternatives and 
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is less restrictive than a multinomial model. In addition, a bivariate probit model possibly 
captures more accurately the decision process by the firm. Tax filing periods may not be the 
same as grant application and granting periods; in addition, firms may not be able to anticipate 
their tax position when applying for direct funding. Hence we believe that a multinomial logit 
approach would not be appropriate in this case. 
 
There will be four possible situations a firm can be in: no support (0,0), no grant but claims a 
tax credit (0,1), gets a grant but does not claim a tax credit (1,0) and both gets a grant and claims 
a tax credit ( 1,1), and therefore four sets of corresponding predicted probabilities, as well as 
four sets of marginal effects.  
 
The model is the following: 
S = 1 if  S*= bsX+es > c,  
S = 0 otherwise   (1) 
 
F = 1 if  F*= bfX + ef > h  
F = 0 otherwise   (2) 
 
Several types of marginal effects may be computed: the marginal effect computed at the mean 
value of explanatory variables, the marginal effect computed at a representative value of the 
explanatory variables, and the average marginal effect, which is the average of the marginal 
effect at each x. For policy analysis, usually the latter is recommended (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009), so these will be our reported results. 
 
We drop from the sample those firms that declare not having an interest in innovating as the 
main reason for not innovating, because we want to focus on the role of barriers for firms that 
do have a potential interest for innovating, thus distinguishing between behavior resulting from 
preferences from behavior resulting from perceived restrictions.   
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Baseline estimation 
We report in Table 3.A and Table 3.B below the estimated average marginal effect of a change 
in the explanatory variable on each of the four possible situations a firm may be in. We test for 
equality of coefficients for equations (1) and (2), and the null is rejected (chi-square test not 
reported in the tables). As specification test, we perform a test for normality of residuals, and do 
not reject the null.
21
   
 
Because we want to see whether the advantages of these two policy tools differ from the firms' 
perspective, we first discuss the estimated average marginal effects we have obtained for the 
probability of using only tax credits and of using only direct support. We find that both for large 
firms and SMEs, being financially constrained reduces the probability of using only tax credits 
by about 4 percentage points, while it increases the probability of obtaining direct support by 
about 2.5 percentage points. These results are consistent with the first two propositions 
formulated in section 2.  
 
Regarding the appropriability issue, as captured by the use of legal protection mechanisms, we 
find that for large firms this variable has a significant and negative average marginal effect on 
the probability of using only tax incentives, but a positive effect on the probability of using only 
direct support. Since we control for past R&D investment, we believe that this result suggests 
that firms whose projects have more innovative content and are more concerned about imitation 
prefer direct support to tax incentives. For SMEs we find a different pattern: those with 
appropriability concerns are more likely to use either tax incentives alone or both instruments.  
It is possible that SMEs' innovation projects are on average of an incremental nature and that the 
cost of applying for direct funding be high relative to the expected probability of obtaining it.  
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 See Chiburis (2010). 
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Finally, we find that for both SMEs and large firms, being a new firm increases the probability 
of having only direct support, and reduces the probability of using only tax credits.  
 
We find other interesting differences on the average marginal effect of other variables on these 
probabilities. Human capital increases the likelihood of using only direct support, but has no 
effect on the use of tax incentives. A firm's relative productivity has a positive effect on the 
probability of using tax incentives only, and on the probability of using both types of support.  
As expected, the variable that captures the overall level of barriers perceived by the firm has a 
positive effect on the use of any support, and a negative effect on the use of none. Finally, we 
find different patterns across industries. While industry type does not affect the use of tax 
incentives, large firms in high-tech industries and in medium-low technological intensity are 
more likely to use direct support. Among SMEs, firms in high-tech and medium high-tech 
industries are those more likely to use tax incentives.  
   
We now look at the other two groups of firms: those that do not use any support, and those that 
use both tax credits and direct support. We find that having previous experience in R&D is the 
most important determinant of (not) using both kinds of support, both for large firms and for 
SMEs. For large firms financial constraints do not seem to have a significant effect, while for 
SMEs they reduce the likelihood of using both tools, and increase the likelihood of using none.  
 
We believe that the significance of past R&D in explaining the use of tax credits (alone or in 
combination with direct support), but not the use of direct support, points to a characteristic of 
R&D-related behavior that previous research has identified: persistence.
22
 In our sample, 89% 
of large firms and 73% of SMEs that were investing in R&D in 2005 also invested in 2008. 
About one fifth of firms switched from not doing R&D in 2005 to doing in 2008 (18% of SMEs 
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 See Mañez-Castillejo, J. A., Rochina-Barrachina, M. E., Sanchis-Llopis, A. and Sanchis-Llopis, J. 
(2009). Sunk costs or increasing dynamic returns to R&D (through learning effects) might explain 
persistence.  
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and 22% of large firms). Many of these "switchers" used some form of public support in the 
period 2006-2008 (45% of SMEs and 66% of large firms).   
 
Overall, our results suggest that direct support may be more effective to encourage firms that 
face financial constraints to invest, or invest more, in R&D, while tax incentives may encourage 
increasing R&D by firms that are not financially constrained and already invest in R&D.  
Results show clearly that direct support and tax incentives are not substitutes in the sense that 
they are not driven by the same factors in the same direction. 
 
When we estimate the model including as a proxy for appropriability the importance of 
information from competitors, which involves using the subsample of innovating firms only, we 
find differences in the effects for large firms and for SMEs.  In the case of large firms, those that 
give a high importance to this source of information are more likely to use tax incentives only, 
and less likely to not using any tool. The sign of the effect on using tax incentives only is the 
opposite of the use of protection, suggesting that both variables capture different things: it is 
possible that information from competitors is relevant when the intensity of rivalry is high, 
creating a situation of neck and neck competition, in which case the firm has an incentive to 
innovate, and therefore claim tax credits. In the case of SMEs, firms that think that information 
from competitors is important for innovation are more likely to not use any form of R&D 
support.  It is not obvious whether large firms and SMEs interpret the survey question in the 
same sense, however. The results concerning the role of financing constraints are the same as in 
the baseline discussed above.  
 
  
23
 
Table 3. A. Large Firms 
Bivariate Probit Regression 
Average Marginal Effect on the probability of… 
 Not having any public support Having both types of support Only using tax incentives  Only having direct support  
Variable Marg Eff 
 
se p-value Marg Eff 
 
se p-value Marg Eff 
 
se p-value Marg Eff 
 
se p-value 
obstAll5 -.1337 .048 0.005 .0534 .028 0.090 .0931 .043 0.033 -.0127 .018 0.473 
obfin5 .0174 .020 0.395 .0076 .012 0.521 -.0477 .018 0.010 .0227 .011 0.031 
obpers5 .0662 .035 0.059 -.0192 .018 0.297 -.0643 .028 0.020 .0173 .015 0.254 
obinfor5 .0335 .033 0.321 -.0071 .018 0.690 .0594 .033 0.072 -.0187 .009 0.046 
obdomin5 .0310 .023 0.171 -.0091 .012 0.437 -.0288 .022 0.200 .0054 .009 0.482 
obddrisk5 .0149 .026 0.560 -.0273 .011 0.014 .0308 .025 0.215 -.0185 .007 0.007 
protect5 -.0308 .017 0.076 .0411 .012 0.001 -.0436 .015 0.003 .0333 .009 0.000 
Ldistprod5 -.0591 .013 0.000 .0283 .007 0.000 .0314 .013 0.015 -.0006 .005 0.887 
remusup6 -.0012 .001 0.048 .0011 .000 0.002 -.0004 .001 0.360 .0006 .000 0.011 
plancredit -.1915 .015 0.000 .0632 .013 0.000 .1562 .016 0.000 -.0280 .005 0.000 
grupo5 -.0215 .020 0.282 .0219 .012 0.075 -.0126 .018 0.472 .0112 .008 0.124 
privdom5 -.0857 .018 0.000 .0702 .014 0.000 -.0066 .018 0.713 .0222 .009 0.015 
bexp5 -.0659 .022 0.003 .0349 .015 0.019 .0316 .021 0.140 -.0006 .008 0.942 
idin5 -.3188 .015 0.000 .2722 .025 0.000 .0461 .025 0.067 .0006 .007 0.937 
lsize5 -.0233 .012 0.054 .0345 .004 0.000 -.0356 .011 0.002 .0244 .003 0.000 
New firm5 -.0897 .129 0.486 .0967 .102 0.342 -.0817 .037 0.028 .0745 .019 0.000 
Age5(x10) .0004 .003 0.914 .0041 .002 0.043 -.0091 .003 0.005 .0045 .001 0.001 
parque -.0566 .053 0.289 .0654 .038 0.087 -.0586 .037 0.114 .0498 .024 0.042 
madrid .0651 .024 0.007 -.0467 .010 0.000 .0009 .023 0.968 -.0193 .006 0.003 
catal -.0461 .020 0.021 .0006 .011 0.953 .0630 .019 0.001 -.0175 .005 0.001 
andal .1453 .040 0.000 -.0620 .017 0.000 -.0773 .031 0.014 -.0060 .013 0.659 
hightec -.1425 .028 0.000 .1208 .022 0.000 -.0093 .028 0.740 .0311 .014 0.030 
medhigh -.0846 .020 0.000 .0583 .015 0.000 .0163 .020 0.404 .0099 .008 0.233 
medlow -.0693 .022 0.001 .0608 .015 0.000 -.0162 .019 0.389 .0247 .009 0.008 
Number of observations: 808; Wald chi2(48)=332.09; Log Pseudolikelihood= -850.69; rho= 0.36 with s.e. 0,06. 
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Table 4. B. SMEs 
Bivariate Probit Regression 
Average Marginal Effect on the probability of… 
 
 Not having any public support Having both types of support Only using tax incentives  Only having direct support 
Variable Marg Eff 
 
se p-value Marg Eff 
 
se p-value Marg Eff 
 
se p-value Marg Eff 
 
se p-value 
obstAll5 -.0741 
.025 0.004 .0427 .014 0.002 .0023 .020 0.906 .0297 .016 0.062 
obfin5 .0300 
.009 0.002 -.0113 .005 0.015 -.0436 .006 0.000 .0248 .007 0.000 
obpers5 .0092 
.012 0.468 -.0074 .006 0.261 .0095 .010 0.348 -.01114 .007 0.114 
obinfor5 .0109 
.013 0.401 -.0036 .007 0.590 -.0148 .009 0.113 .0075 .008 0.349 
obdomin5 .0079 
.010 0.453 -.0050 .005 0.355 .007 .008 0.741 -.0055 .006 0.359 
obddrisk5 -.0007 
.011 0.945 -.0030 .006 0.595 .0154 .008 0.073 -.0116 .006 0.048 
protect5 -.0602 
.008 0.000 .0299 .005 0.000 .0310 .007 0.000 .0007 .005 0.890 
ldistprod5 -.0435 
.005 0.000 .0179 .003 0.000 .0360 .004 0.000 -.0104 .003 0.001 
remusup6 -.0038 
.000 0.000 .0022 .000 0.000 -.0000 .000 0.944 .0002 .000 0.000 
plancredit -.2010 
.007 0.000 .1035 .0068 0.000 .1184 .008 0.000 -.0208 .004 0.000 
grupo5 -.0269 
.010 0.009 .0015 .0058 0.009 .0038 .008 0.637 .0080 .006 0.209 
privdom5 -.0850 
.017 0.000 .0442 .011 0.000 .0395 .013 0.003 -.0013 .009 0.891 
bexp5 -.0715 
.010 0.000 .0353 .006 0.000 .0383 .008 0.000 -.0022 .006 0.704 
idin5 -.2006 
.011 0.000 .1243 .010 0.000 .0669 .010 0.000 .0093 .007 0.171 
lsize5 -.0687 
.005 0.000 .0381 .003 0.000 .0062 .004 0.121 .0243 .003 0.000 
New firm5 -.0705 
.028 0.013 .0393 .017 0.022 -.0627 .016 0.000 .0939 .023 0.000 
Age5 (x10) -.0071 
.002 0.002 .0040 .001 0.001 .0002 .001 0.873 .003 .001 0.041 
parque -.1275 
.028 0.000 .0797 .020 0.000 .0139 .020 0.485 .0338 .017 0.045 
madrid .0563 
.014 0.000 -.0248 .006 0.000 -.0334 .011 0.002 .0019 .009 0.839 
catal -.0079 
.009 0.383 -.0049 .005 0.302 .0368 .008 0.000 -.0238 .004 0.000 
andal .0850 
.018 0.000 -.0415 .008 0.000 -.0173 .013 0.199 -.0261 .010 0.009 
hightec -.1325 
.015 0.000 .0772 .011 0.000 .0435 .013 0.001 .0119 .010 0.215 
medhigh -.0704 
.010 0.000 .0291 .006 0.000 .0559 .008 0.000 -.0145 .006 0.010 
medlow -.0259 
.011 0.019 .0137 .006 0.027 .0079 .008 0.371 .0044 .007 0.515 
Number of observations=3517; Wald chi2(48)=912.67; Log Pseudolikelihood=-3156.4; rho=0.30 with s.e.=0.03. 
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4.2 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
We have performed alternative estimations to check for the robustness of our results to a series 
of changes. These are the following. First, we have reestimated the model adding a binary 
variable for low financing constraints and using different subsamples of firms:  a subset of firms 
that introduced products new to the market in 2005 or before, because this particular subset may 
be more sensitive to appropriability issues; a subset of firms that did R&D in 2005, and subset 
of firms in high tech and medium tech manufacturing sectors. Results remain basically 
unchanged across subsamples for SMEs, and for the first subsample in the case of large firms. 
For the subsample of large firms that did R&D in 2005, and for the subsample of firms in the 
high tech and medium high tech industries, financial constraints are not associated to the 
likelihood of using any of these policy tools. This constraint remains significant for SMEs.      
 
Second, we re-estimate the model dropping some outliers for one of the continuous control 
variables, relative productivity, and find that results remain basically unaffected.  
 
Third, we change the definition of dependent variables, tax credits and direct support. Instead of 
using binary variables referring to the 2006-8 period, we use binary variables referring to year 
2008 only. In addition, regarding direct support the question asked is not identical. For the three 
year period, firms are asked whether they received any direct support for innovation activities, 
including loans and grants. The question referring to year 2008 includes only grants for in-house 
R&D. We find that the main estimates of interest remain stable.  
 
Finally, we change the way we calculate constraints, partly because we fear that correlation 
among the set of barriers to innovation may affect standard errors. We define for each barrier 
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the ratio between the ranking for that barrier and the average value for all barriers, as perceived 
by the firm. We find that the main results are not affected.  
23
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Our analysis has addressed the preferences of Spanish firms regarding the use of two tools of 
public support to private R&D activities, linking them to potential barriers to innovation, with 
special focus on the role of financial constraints and appropriability indicators. Using data from 
PITEC for the periods 2003-2005 and 2006-2008, we have estimated the determinants of the 
likelihood of using these tools jointly, in isolation or none.  
 
Results support the main hypothesis that tax incentives and direct funding are not perfect 
substitutes, because financing constraints affect differently the likelihood of using each 
instrument. In particular, our findings show that the probability to use tax incentives falls when 
firms face financial constraints, while the likelihood of using direct funding increases. There are 
differences as well regarding the effect of appropriability, as measured by the use of legal forms 
of protection. The direction of this effect is not the same for large firms and for SMEs. While 
large firms that have used protection methods are less likely to use tax incentives, and more 
likely to use direct support, SMEs that protect their ideas are more likely to use tax incentives.  
 
These results do suggest there is a link between the nature and extent of market failures related 
to R&D and the use of these two tools of public support to private R&D, a point not previously 
made in the literature. However, while the survey questions related to financial constraints are 
unambiguous, the issue of appropriability remains very difficult to evaluate with the questions 
currently used in the survey. Some innovation project level information could be helpful in that 
regard, as well as introducing questions similar to those used in the Yale and Carnegie Mellon 
surveys regarding the importance of secrecy and lead time. 
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  All robustness results are available on request. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics 
  SMEs LARGE  
 Variable N mean sd min p50 max N mean sd min p50 max 
              
Awareness of constraints obstAll5 3685 .507 .224 0 .523 1 835 .424 .232 0 .428 1 
Financially constrained obfin5 3685 .389 .487 0 0 1 835 .241 .428 0 0 1 
Lack of personnel obpers5 3685 .133 .340 0 0 1 835 .069 .254 0 0 1 
Lack of information obinfor5 3685 .135 .342 0 0 1 835 .082 .275 0 0 1 
Dominant firm obdom5 3685 .206 .405 0 0 1 835 .158 .365 0 0 1 
Demand risk obddrisk5 3685 .206 .404 0 0 1 835 .134 .340 0 0 1 
Appropriability_a protect5 3685 .355 .478 0 0 1 835 .388 .487 0 0 1 
Appropriability_b Infocomp 3439 .137 .344 0 0 1 736 .138 .346 0 0 1 
Log of Relative productivity* ldistprod 3685 -.331 .822 -13.38 -.309 2.82 835 -.041 .706 -4.719 -.0189 2.333 
Share of highly educated employees* humcap 3685 18.65 18.48 0 13 100 835 13.42 14.44 0 9.4 100 
Take into account tax incentives plantax 3912 .411 .492 0 0 1 933 .533 .499 0 1 1 
Group membership* group5 3685 .237 .425 0 0 1 835 .748 .434 0 1 1 
Private domestic firm* privdom5 3685 .927 .258 0 1 1 835 .665 .471 0 1 1 
Exporter* bexp5 3685 .711 .452 0 1 1 835 .843 .363 0 1 1 
Did in-house R&D*  rdin5 3685 .768 .421 0 1 1 835 .717 .450 0 1 1 
Log of number of employees* lsize5 3685 3.606 .956 0 3.63 7.15 835 6.00 .717 4.060 5.855 9.232 
New firm* new_5 3685 .023 .150 0 0 1 835 .009 .077 0 0 1 
Age* age5 3735 22.94 17.85 0 19 166 904 32.95 22.75 0 30 170 
Located in technological park park 3912 .020 .143 0 0 1 933 .027 .164 0 0 1 
Firm located in Madrid madrid 3912 .077 .267 0 0 1 933 .173 .378 0 0 1 
Frim located in Catalonia catal 3912 .296 .456 0 0 1 933 .302 .459 0 0 1 
Firm located in Andalusia andal 3912 .052 .222 0 0 1 933 .039 .195 0 0 1 
Firm in high tech sector hightec 3912 .097 .296 0 0 1 933 .117 .322 0 0 1 
Firm in med-high sector medhigh 3912 .340 .473 0 0 1 933 .305 .460 0 0 1 
Firm in med-low sector medlow 3912 .261 .439 0 0 1 933 .270 .444 0 0 1 
 
Note: all variables marked * refer to year 2005; otherwise they refer to the period 2003-2005 
 
